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Abstract
Deep learning classifiers are known to be vulnerable to
adversarial examples. A recent paper presented at ICML
2019 proposed a statistical test detection method based on
the observation that logits of noisy adversarial examples
are biased toward the true class. The method is evaluated
on CIFAR-10 dataset and is shown to achieve 99% true pos-
itive rate (TPR) at only 1% false positive rate (FPR).
In this paper, we first develop a classifier-based adap-
tation of the statistical test method and show that it im-
proves the detection performance. We then propose Logit
Mimicry Attack method to generate adversarial examples
such that their logits mimic those of benign images. We
show that our attack bypasses both statistical test and
classifier-based methods, reducing their TPR to less than
2.2% and 1.6%, respectively, even at 5% FPR. We finally
show that a classifier-based detector that is trained with
logits of mimicry adversarial examples can be evaded by
an adaptive attacker that specifically targets the detector.
Furthermore, even a detector that is iteratively trained to
defend against adaptive attacker cannot be made robust,
indicating that statistics of logits cannot be used to detect
adversarial examples.
1. Introduction
Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning
models that an attacker intentionally designs to cause the
model to make a mistake [1]. One particular method for
generating adversarial examples for image classifiers is
adding small perturbations to benign inputs such that the
modified image is misclassified by the model, but a human
observer perceives the original content [2, 3].
Several methods have been proposed for developing ro-
bust algorithms that classify adversarily perturbed exam-
ples into their ground-truth label, of which adversarial train-
ing is shown to be an effective approach [4]. Several
other defenses have been broken with adaptive iterative at-
tacks [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. A different approach for defend-
ing against adversarial examples is to detect whether an
random
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Figure 1: Average prediction probability of true class for
samples across random and adversarial directions. (Left) Il-
lustration of directions and locations of benign sample, x,
and adversarial example, x′. (Middle) Probability map for
adversarial examples generated using CW attack. (Right)
Probability map for adversarial examples generated using
logit mimicry attack. CW adversarial examples are em-
bedded in a cone-like structure, referred to as adversarial
cone in [14], indicating that adding noise increases expected
probability of true class. Mimicry adversarial examples,
however, do not show such cone structure and are nearly
as robust to noise as benign samples.
input is adversarially manipulated. Several such detection
methods have been proposed, but later shown to be ineffec-
tive [11, 12, 13].
A recent paper presented at ICML 2019 proposed a de-
tection method based on a statistical test that measures how
logits change under noise [14]. The authors posited that ro-
bustness of logits are different, depending on whether the
input is naturally generated or adversarially manipulated.
Figure 1 visualizes this observation by measuring the av-
erage true probability across random and adversarial direc-
tions. The cone-like structure, referred to as adversarial
cone in [14], indicates that the adversarial sample is “sur-
rounded” by the true class. The authors then proposed to
add noise to inputs as an approach to partially undo the ef-
fect of adversarial perturbations and, thus, detect and cor-
rectly classify adversarial examples. The method is evalu-
ated on CIFAR-10 dataset and is shown to achieve 99% true
positive rate (TPR) at only 1% false positive rate (FPR).
Unlike adversarial training method, several proposals for
robust classifiers or detectors rely on “subtle” properties of
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models or benign or adversarial examples that are not “tied”
to how the classification works, i.e., the model is not re-
quired to satisfy those properties to achieve good classi-
fication performance. Such defenses can be bypassed by
Mimicry Attack, in which the attacker generates adversarial
examples to not only fool the classifier, but also mimic the
behavior of benign examples, where the specific behavior
is derived from the mechanism that distinguishes between
benign and adversarial examples. In [14], the authors ob-
served that logits of adversarial examples are not robust to
noise. In this paper, we show that this is a subtle prop-
erty that is not fundamental to adversarial examples or deep
learning classifiers, i.e., adversarial examples can be crafted
such that they are misclassified by the model and their logits
are indistinguishable from logits of benign examples. Our
contributions are summarized in the following.
• We first propose a classifier-based adaptation of the
statistical test method. The proposed classifier takes
logits of clean and noisy images as input and detects
whether the image is adversarial. We show that such
a classifier is able to identify anomalies in adversarial
logits beyond their directionality toward the true class.
Specifically, it improves the detection performance of
the statistical test method against CW attack and suc-
ceeds even in small noise regimes where the test fails.
• We then propose Logit Mimicry Attack (LMA), where
the attacker collects logit profiles of clean and noisy
benign images and crafts adversarial examples such
that their logits are similar to those of benign images.
We perform experiments on ResNet-56 network and
CIFAR-10 dataset and show that our attack bypasses
both statistical test and classifier-based methods, re-
ducing the TPR to less than 2.2% and 1.6%, respec-
tively, even at FPR of 5%. Figure 1 visualizes the
changes of average true probability across random and
adversarial directions and shows that mimicry adver-
sarial examples do not display the cone structure of
the examples obtained from CW attack and are nearly
as robust to noise as benign samples.
• We then propose a mimicry detector, a classifier that
is trained with logits of mimicry adversarial examples.
Such a classifier improves the detection performance
against LMA and achieves TPR of 62.7% at 5% FPR.
We, however, show that an adaptive attacker that gen-
erates adversarial examples that evade both classifier
and detector can successfully bypass the mimicry clas-
sifier, reducing the TPR to 1.7% at FPR of 5%.
• We finally consider a detector that is iteratively trained
against adaptive attack, i.e., at each iteration, adver-
sarial examples are generated to bypass the detector
and then the detector is trained to classify them as ad-
versarial. Once training is done, the final detector is
tested against the adaptive attack. We show that such
a detector only achieves the TPR of 2.9% at 5% FPR.
The results indicate that logits of benign and adver-
sarial exmaples are not fundamentally distinguishable,
i.e., new adversarial examples can be always generated
that evade both the network and any detector.
The code for mimicry attack is available at
https://github.com/HosseinHosseini/
Mimicry-Attack.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we provide the notations used in this pa-
per and review the projected gradient descent method for
generating adversarial examples.
2.1. Notations
Let f : x→ z be a function that takes an image x ∈ Rd,
where d is the number of pixels, and outputs the logit vector
z ∈ Rk, where k is the number of classes. The probability
vector Y ∈ Rk is then obtained as Y = S(f(x)), where
S is the softmax function, and the predicted label is y =
argmaxi Yi = argmaxi zi. Let `(x, y; θ) denote the loss of
the classifier with parameters θ on (x, y). When holding θ
fixed and viewing the loss as a function of (x, y), we simply
write `(x, y).
2.2. Adversarial Examples
We consider a class of adversarial examples for image
classifiers where small (imperceptible) perturbations are
added to images to force the model to misclassify them.
We consider the case where the L∞ norm of perturbation
is bounded. The attacker’s problem is stated as follows:
given x, find x′ (1)
s.t. ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ max and f(x′) 6= y,
where x and x′ are the clean and adversarial samples, re-
spectively, y is the true label, and max is the maximum
allowed absolute change to each pixel.
Several optimization-based methods have been proposed
for generating adversarial examples, including fast gradient
sign method [15], iterative gradient method [16], and Car-
lini and Wagner (CW) attack [5]. It has been observed that
the specific choice of optimizer is less important than choos-
ing to use iterative optimization-based methods [4].
We generate adversarial examples using the Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) method [16, 4], which provides
a unified framework for iterative attacks independent of the
specific optimization function. Let n be the number of steps
and xj be the image at step j. We have x0 = x and x′ = xn.
At step j, the image is updated as
xj+1 = ΠX+S(xj + step sign(vj)), (2)
where vj is the attack vector at step j, step is the added
perturbation per step, and Πx+S is the projection operator
where S is the set of allowed perturbations. In the case of
bounded L∞ constraint, projector clips each pixel within
max of the corresponding pixel of original image x.
The attack vector takes different forms depending on the
attack goal. Generally, the attacker’s goal is to maximize
the loss on the defender’s desired output or alternatively
minimize the loss on attacker’s desired output. These ap-
proaches lead to two common attacks respectively known
as misclassification and targeted attacks, for which attack
vectors are specified as follows:
• v = ∇x`(x, y), for misclassification attack,
• v = −∇x`(x, yt), for targeted attack,
where yt 6= y is the attacker’s desired target label.
3. Detecting Adversarial Examples Based on
Logit Anomalies
In this section, we first review the logit-based statistical
test proposed in [14] for detecting adversarial examples and
then describe our classifier-based adaptation of the method.
3.1. Statistical Test Proposed in [14]
In [14], a method is proposed for detecting adversarial
examples and estimating their true class. The method is
based on a statistical test that measures how logits change
under noise. Let fy1,y2(x) = fy2(x) − fy1(x), where
fy(x) denotes the logit of class y for input x. Consider
fyf ,y(x + δ), where yf = argmaxy fy(x) is the predicted
label and δ is the noise. Note that for y 6= yf , fyf ,y(x) is
negative and might increase with noise. The authors posited
that common methods for generating adversarial examples
result in perturbations that “overfit to specifics of x and are
not robust,” i.e., by adding noise to the adversarial example,
the expected probability of the true class increases.
For an adversarial example x and true label y∗, if the
adversarial perturbation is not robust to noise, we will have
fyf ,y∗(x + δ) > fyf ,y∗(x), meaning that adding noise will
partially undo the effect of adversarial perturbation. This is
the basis of the statistical test, i.e., we obtain the logits of
noisy inputs and check whether the expected logit value of a
label increased under noise. Such an input is detected to be
adversarially perturbed and the label with increasing logit
is output as the correct class. The details of the method is
provided in the following.
• Let gyf ,y(x, δ) = fyf ,y(x + δ) − fyf ,y(x). The nor-
malized term is obtained as g¯y,z(x, δ) = (gy,z(x, δ)−
µy,z)/σy,z , where µy,z and σy,z are mean and standard
deviation of gy,z(x, δ) computed on benign examples.
Let g¯yf ,y(x) = Eδ[g¯yf ,y(x, δ)].
• Inputs are flagged as adversarially manipulated if
max
y 6=yf
{g¯yf ,y(x)− τyf ,y} ≥ 0, (3)
where the thresholds τyf ,y are computed such that the
true positive rate (TPR) is maximized, while the false
positive rate (FPR) remains small (say 1%). If an in-
put is detected to be an adversarial example, its correct
label is predicted as argmaxy 6=yf {g¯yf ,y(x)− τyy,y}.
3.2. Our Classifier-Based Detection Method
The detection method exploits the statistics of logits of
clean and noisy inputs to distinguish between benign and
adversarial samples. We note that instead of computing
g¯yf ,y(x) and the thresholds τyf ,y , we can design a generic
binary classifier that takes logits of clean and noisy images
as input and detects whether the image is adversarial. The
advantage of using such a classifier is that it can identify
anomalies in adversarial logits beyond their directionality
toward the true label and, hence, improves the detection
performance. Our classifier-based detection method is de-
scribed in the following.
• For validation data x, generate adversarial samples x′.
• Compute logits of clean inputs and the average log-
its of noisy inputs, i.e., compute f(x), f¯(x + δ) =
Eδ[f(x+ δ)], f(x′), f¯(x′ + δ) = Eδ[f(x′ + δ)].
• Construct vectors L(x) = f(x)||f¯(x+δ) and L(x′) =
f(x′)||f¯(x′ + δ), where || denotes concatenation.
• Train a detector classifier with input-output pairs
(L(x), 0) and (L(x′), 1).
In experiments, we use a neural network with two hid-
den layers of size 100 and ReLU activation for the detector.
Note that the statistical test method can be exactly imple-
mented by such a network as well. Therefore, we expect
our approach to be able to better distinguish between benign
and adversarial examples. Figure 2 illustrates our classifier-
based detection method.
4. Bypassing Logit-Based Detection Methods
In this section, we first review the attack approach of
computing adversarial perturbations on noisy images and
then propose the logit mimicry attack for bypassing the
logit-based detection methods.
Detector𝑓 𝑥 || ҧ𝑓 𝑥 + 𝛿 Benign/Adversarial
Figure 2: Classifier-based adaptation of the detection
method proposed in [14]. The classifier takes logits of
clean image, f(x), and the average logits of noisy images,
f¯(x+ δ) = Eδ[f(x+ δ)], as input and detects whether the
image is adversarial.
4.1. Attacking with Noisy Inputs
The statistical test method uses the property that adver-
sarial examples are less robust to noise compared to benign
examples. Based on this observation, [14] suggested that,
to bypass the defense, the attacker needs to craft perturba-
tions that perform well in expectation under noise. In this
attack, the PGD update is computed based on the following
loss function:
ˆ`(x, y) = α`(x, y) + (1− α)Eδ[`(x+ δ, y)], (4)
where α balances the attack updates for clean and noisy in-
puts. In experiments, we set α = 0.25 and compute the loss
as an empirical average over 10 noisy inputs, with the same
noise source used for detection.
4.2. Logit Mimicry Attack
Our classifier-based approach provides an additional in-
sight into how the detection method can be bypassed. Re-
call that the detector takes the logits of clean images and the
average logits of noisy images as input. Therefore, instead
of computing perturbations that are robust to noise, the at-
tacker can craft adversarial examples such that their logits
mimic those of benign images. Specifically, an adversarial
image that is classified as class y must have similar logits
to benign images that belong to the same class. Moreover,
its expected logits of noisy examples must mimic average
logits of noisy benign images that belong to that class. We
call our attack Logit Mimicry Attack. The attack details are
described in the following.
• Let x be a validation image and yf be the predicted
label, i.e., yf = argmaxi fi(x). For each class y, we
compute the logit profiles of clean and noisy images
respectively as follows:{
hy = Ex|yf=y[f(x)]
h′y = Ex|yf=y[Eδ[f(x+ δ)]].
(5)
• Given a test image x, we aim to generate adversarial
example x′ with the target class yt. The attack losses
on clean and noisy images are defined as follows:{
`(x, yt) = ‖f(x)− hyt‖2,
`δ(x, yt) = ‖f(x+ δ)− h′yt‖2.
(6)
• The logit mimicry attack loss is then obtained as
`LMA(x, yt) = α`(x, yt) + (1− α)`δ(x, yt), (7)
where α balances the loss on clean and noisy inputs.
In experiments, we set α = 0.25.
5. Experimental Results
In this section, we present the experimental results
of evaluating statistical test and classifier-based methods
against different attacks.
5.1. Attack Setup
The experiments are performed on ResNet-56 net-
work [17] and CIFAR-10 dataset [18]. The network
achieves 92.7% accuracy on CIFAR-10 test data. As sug-
gested in [14], for each image, we generate 256 noisy im-
ages as xn = clip(x + v,−1, 1), where v ∼ N (0, 1)
and  ∈ {10−2, 10−1, 1, 10}. Note that the pixel range is
in [−1, 1]. We train the detector with 1000 images of the
CIFAR-10 validation set, from which 800 images are used
for training and the rest are used for validation. We then test
the detector on 1000 test images of CIFAR-10 dataset.
The results are presented for targeted attack with PGD
method. We generate adversarial examples using 50 steps
of PGD with L∞ perturbation of max = 8/255 ≈ 3% of
the pixel dynamic range, as done in [14]. In all cases, we set
the attack hyperparameters such that the attack success rate
in evading the classifier is more than 99%. Unless stated
otherwise, we use the CW loss function [5] in our attacks,
which maximizes the logit of the targeted class, while min-
imizing the largest value of other logits as
`(x, yt) = (−fyt(x) + max
y 6=yt
fy(x) + κ)+, (8)
where higher values of κ generates adversarial examples
with higher confidence. We set κ = 50 in our experiments.
We use CW’s approach, since it computes the loss using the
logits and, hence, is more relevant to the detection method
proposed in [14].
Threat Model. Various threat models have been consid-
ered for defending against evasion attacks. Commonly used
threat models are white-box (complete knowledge of the
system) and black-box (knowledge of training procedure
and architecture of target model, but no access to the trained
model itself). As stated in [19], “the guiding principle of a
defense’s threat model is to assume that the adversary has
complete knowledge of the inner workings of the defense.”
That is, even in black-box setting, it must be assumed that
the attacker is fully aware of the defense mechanism. In the
field of security, this guideline is derived from Kerckhoffs’s
principle [20], which is stated also as “The enemy knows
the system” by Claude Shannon [21].
Table 1: True Positive Rate (TPR) of statistical test method proposed in [14] and our classifier-based approach against
different attacks and with False Positive Rates (FPR) of 1% and 5%. Experiments are performed on ResNet-56 network and
CIFAR-10 dataset. Noisy images are generated as xn = clip(x+ v,−1, 1), where v ∼ N (0, 1) and pixel range is in [−1, 1].
Adversarial examples are generated using targeted attack with maximum L∞ perturbation of  = 8/255 ≈ 3% of the pixel
dynamic range. The results show that logit mimicry attack bypasses both detection methods. (Higher numbers indicate better
detection performance).
Detection Method 
CW CW with Noisy Inputs Logit Mimicry
FPR= 1% FPR= 5% FPR= 1% FPR= 5% FPR= 1% FPR= 5%
Statistical Test
0.01 38.2% 55.4% 29.0% 51.8% 0.1% 0.9%
0.1 96.6% 99.9% 3.6% 48.8% 0.3% 2.2%
1 96.1% 98.4% 58.4% 69.2% 0.0% 0.0%
10 96.9% 98.6% 77.6% 88.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Classifier-based
0.01 97.8% 99.4% 99.2% 99.6% 0.0% 0.0%
0.1 99.9% 100% 74.9% 93.5% 0.0% 1.6%
1 99.5% 99.7% 69.8% 81.6% 0.0% 0.2%
10 98.1% 99.0% 83.9% 92.0% 0.0% 0.1%
In [14], the authors claimed robustness in white-box set-
ting. However, most of the analysis and experiments were
performed for the case where the attacker is not aware of the
defense. The authors only briefly discussed attacking with
noisy inputs as a defense-aware attack, which we show is
not the right countermeasure against the defense. In our ex-
periments, we consider white-box threat model and assume
that the attacker is fully aware of the defense method.
5.2. Attack Results
CW Attack. Table 1 shows the attack results for different
settings. As can be seen, when noise is large enough, the
statistical test method achieves more than 96% true positive
rate (TPR) at 1% and 5% false positive rates (FPR). The
classifier-based approach achieves higher TPR especially
when the noise is too small, indicating that it can better
identify anomalies in adversarial logits. The results verify
the observation that adversarial examples that are generated
by only maximizing the loss on the true class are less ro-
bust to noise compared to benign examples. Figure 3 vi-
sualizes this property by measuring the average prediction
probabilities of different classes versus noise. It can be seen
that, in CW adversarial examples, there is a range of , in
which the true class is the most likely class, indicating that
noisy CW adversarial examples are, indeed, biased toward
the true class.
CW Attack with Noisy Inputs. As can be seen in Table 1,
adding noise to inputs at each PGD step reduces the de-
tection performance of the statistical test method, but the
method still achieves high TPR. Also, the attack approach is
less effective against the classifier-based method, suggest-
ing that logits of adversarial examples generated by noisy
CW attack contain anomalies that can be identified by a
more complex detector.
Logit Mimicry Attack. The mimicry attack bypasses both
statistical test and classifier-based methods, resulting in less
than 2.2% TPR in all cases. The results show that such
statistics-based defense mechanisms could be evaded by
crafting adversarial examples that mimic the behavior of
benign samples. Figure 3 shows the behavior of predic-
tion probabilities versus noise and confirms that, unlike CW
attack, in mimicry adversarial examples, the true class is
never the most likely class, i.e., the directionality toward the
true class has been eliminated. Figure 4 also shows samples
of adversarial examples generated using CW and mimicry
attacks. As can be seen, both attacks could evade the clas-
sifier by adding imperceptible perturbations to images.
6. Does There Exist Any Logit-Based Robust
Detector?
In previous section, we showed that a classifier-based
detector that is trained with CW adversarial examples can
be bypassed with logit mimicry attack. The detector can
be similarly trained with adversarial examples obtained us-
ing mimicry attack. In this section, we investigate whether
such a classifier can detect mimicry adversarial examples
and how it can be attacked.
Training Detector with Mimicry Adversarial Examples.
We follow the same approach of training a binary classi-
fier proposed in Section 3.2, but generate adversarial exam-
ples using the logit mimicry attack. The attack results are
provided in Table 2. As can be seen, the detector achieves
62.7% TPR at 5% FPR, indicating that the logits of mimicry
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(a) Benign examples.
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
epsilon
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
ed
ict
io
n 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
True Class
Adversarial Class
Most-likely Other Class
(b) CW adversarial examples.
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(c) Mimicry adversarial examples generated
with  = 0.1.
Figure 3: Average prediction probability for noisy inputs, xn = clip(x+ v,−1, 1), where v ∼ N (0, 1). In CW adversarial
examples, there is a range of , in which the probability of predicted (adversarial) class is less than the true class. This
observation implies that noisy adversarial examples are biased toward the true class. In mimicry adversarial examples,
however, the true class is never the most likely class.
Figure 4: Samples of original and adversarial examples of
CIFAR-10 dataset. (Left) original images, (Middle) adver-
sarial examples generated using CW attack, (Right) adver-
sarial examples generated using logit mimicry attack.
adversarial examples are highly distinguishable from those
of benign samples.
Adaptive Attacker. To evade the adaptive detector, the at-
tacker must craft adversarial examples that fool both the
main network and the detector. Specifically, adversarial ex-
amples must be generated by minimizing the network’s loss
on targeted class and the detector’s loss on benign class. We
use logit mimicry attack to evade the network, since it also
helps in bypassing the detector. The attack method is de-
scribed in the following.
• Let f be a function that takes a sample x as input and
outputs the logits. Let alsoD be a binary classifier that
takes logits of the clean sample and the average logits
of noisy samples, and outputs zero if the image is be-
nign and one otherwise. Let pbenign be the prediction
probability of the benign class. We define the detec-
tor’s loss on sample x as `D(x) = − log(pbenign).
• The overall attacker’s loss is then computed as
`Adaptive(x, yt) = α`LMA(x, yt) + (1− α)`D(x), (9)
Table 2: True Positive Rate (TPR) of classifier-based de-
tection methods. Experiments are performed on ResNet-56
network and CIFAR-10 dataset. Noisy images are gener-
ated as xn = clip(x + v,−1, 1), where v ∼ N (0, 1) and
 = 0.1 (pixel range is in [−1, 1]). Adversarial examples are
generated using targeted attack with maximum L∞ pertur-
bation of  = 8/255 ≈ 3% of the pixel dynamic range. The
results show that any classifier-based detection method fails
against adaptive attacker. (Higher numbers indicate better
detection performance).
Detection Method
Logit Mimicry Attack Adaptive Attack
FPR= 1% FPR= 5% FPR= 1% FPR= 5%
Adaptive Detector 26.6% 62.7% 0.4% 1.7%
Iteratively-trained
Detector
49.4% 83.1% 0.6% 2.9%
where `LMA(x, yt) is defined in Equ. 7. In experiments,
we set α = 0.25.
The adaptive attack achieves 100% success rate in evading
the network and, as can be seen in Table 2, reduces the TPR
of the adaptive detector to 1.7%.
Iteratively-Trained Detector, Adaptive Attacker. We
showed that adaptive attack successfully bypasses the adap-
tive detector. The question is does there exist any logit-
based detector that is robust against adaptive attack? To an-
swer this question, we iteratively update the detector against
the adaptive attack, i.e., we train a detector and then itera-
tively run the adaptive attack against it and fine-tune the
detector with the new adversarial examples. Once training
is done, we run adaptive attack on final detector. In experi-
ments, we train the detector for 25 iterations. At each itera-
tion, the detector is trained for five epochs with 1000 adap-
tive adversarial examples as well as 1000 benign samples.
𝐷
𝑓 𝑥′ || ҧ𝑓 𝑥′ + 𝛿
Benign/Adversarial
𝑓 𝑥 || ҧ𝑓 𝑥 + 𝛿
Iteratively do:
• Generate adversarial examples 𝑥′, s.t. 𝐷 𝑓 𝑥′ || ҧ𝑓 𝑥′ + 𝛿 = 0
• Update 𝐷, s.t. ൞
𝐷 𝑓 𝑥 || ҧ𝑓 𝑥 + 𝛿 = 0
𝐷 𝑓 𝑥′ || ҧ𝑓 𝑥′ + 𝛿 = 1
Figure 5: Iteratively training the detector. Detector is a clas-
sifier that takes logits of clean image, f(x), and the average
logits of noisy images, f¯(x + δ) = Eδ[f(x + δ)], as input
and detects whether the image is adversarial. We iteratively
run adaptive attack against the detector and fine-tune the de-
tector with the new adversarial examples.
Figure 5 illustrates the training procedure of iteratively-
trained detector.
As can be seen in Table 2, while such a detector achieves
high TPR against the logit mimicry attack, it completely
fails against the adaptive attacker. That is, even after iter-
atively training the classifier to detect adaptive adversarial
examples, we can always find new examples that evade both
network and detector. The results indicate that distinguisha-
bility of benign and adversarial logits is not a fundamental
property of deep convolutional networks and, hence, cannot
be used to detect adversarial examples.
7. Conclusion
A recent paper presented at ICML 2019 proposed a sta-
tistical test method for detecting adversarial examples. The
method is designed based on the observation that logits of
noisy adversarial examples “tend to have a characteristic
direction” toward the true class, whereas it does not have
any specific direction if the input is benign. In this pa-
per, we first developed a classifier-based adaptation of the
statistical test method, which improves the detection per-
formance. We then proposed the Logit Mimicry Attack
(LMA) method to generate adversarial examples such that
the logits of clean and noisy images mimic the distribution
of those of benign samples. We showed that LMA success-
fully bypasses both the statistical test and classifier-based
methods. We finally evaluated the robustness of a detector
that is iteratively trained to detect adversarial examples that
are specifically generated to bypass it. We showed that even
such a detector fails against the adaptive attack, indicating
that adversarial logits can be made to mimic any character-
istic behavior of benign logits.
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